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对谈：WTO 展望未来（中）
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这是选·美的第1022篇文章
2018年10月12日，在 CSIS（Center for Strategic & International Studies）总部，国际商务高级顾问 William Alan Reinsch 与美国驻世界贸易组织大使兼美国贸易代表 Dennis Shea 就全球贸易体系和 WTO 在不断变化的世界中的地位进行对话。
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R: William Alan Reinsch
S: Dennis Shea
R: 第一个问题是，谁来制定规则：上诉机构自己，还是仲裁解决机构？我觉得在座的大部分人都会同意，这应该让成员国决定。
S: 这是我们在1994年就达成一致的一点。
R: 好的，但是这没有解决第二个问题：假设冲裁解决机构想把上诉机构的一些现有做法合法化，但这些做法是我们不同意的。
S: 这只能以共识的方法实现，而我们就可以对它表示反对。
R: 好的。有一点很重要：这些问题在特朗普政府之前就已经存在了。奥巴马政府就采取过一系列措施，尤其是在有关重新任命机构成员的问题上采取了一系列行动，以反映奥巴马政府对类似问题的不满。我们必须认识到，这些都不是新问题。事实上早在1994年就有人说，这些问题早晚会发生。所以，我不觉得在座会有很多人认为这届政府的论调是错置的：就像特朗普政府的一些其它论调一样，它们的诊断可能是正确的，但是治疗方案却不见得正确。这届政府的策略是阻挠上诉机构补充新空出来的职位，不论是重新委任还是全新委任，以致于我们已经到了这种地步：到明年年末，上诉机构就会达不到法定人数了，因为只剩两个人了；这就让上诉机构变得不能运转。我们有什么替代方案吗？怎样才能解决这些问题？还是说这届政府的目的就是让上诉机构死掉，然后看看接下来会怎样？
S: 再说一次，我们的立场是让上诉机构回到我们最初商定的形式上去，回到1995年协定里的形式。人们问我美国想要什么，我们的谈判要求是什么；我们的提议是，让上诉机构遵循我们在1995年定下的规则。它已经走偏了。
我在与我的同事们合作，如果他们有什么提议，我们会考虑并作出回应。但是到目前为止，日内瓦那边还没有什么提议。你谈到了欧盟那份文件，那是份来自布鲁塞尔的文件，只不过是在日内瓦强调了一下而已。我理解欧盟想把一些问题带到日内瓦去讨论。我们的立场是，这些我们已经谈判过了，上诉机构必须回到我们谈好的形式上去；一个巴掌拍不响，我们正在等其他成员国回应。说实话，上诉机构的事我在日内瓦WTO常常听到，但是目前还看不到任何有意义的提案，对此我感到很惊讶。如果这个问题这么重要，为什么没人出主意？
R: 我一开始提到的那篇文章大意就是，人们正在更加重视这些问题，所以我们对此可以有所期待。你开始提到WTO是个效率低下的组织，我们先假设，就算事情按照你希望的方向发展，它也会花很久。到了2019年12月，我们还在阻挠上诉机构的重新任命，现在他们只剩两个人了。我们是这个制度的一个主要用户，我们在提诉和应诉方面都是大头，我们的提诉通常都能赢，我们的应诉结果也都不坏，虽然起诉方通常都会赢。如果上诉机构停止运转了，那些我们在乎的案子该怎么办？如果我们在2020年输了一场大案、无路可退了，该怎么办？
S: 我需要再次重复，我们会拭目以待。我们已经提出了我们的提案，我们正在等其它成员国回应。《解决争端谅解书》里也有其它选项，第25条里的仲裁就是一种可能性。但我要重复，我们想要让仲裁机构回到最初商定好的形式。
R: 你支持《解决争端谅解书》第25条吗？
S: 有可能。
R: 我们在上诉机构里没有指定席位，但是其中一个成员是美国人（Thomas R. Graham），如果我没记错的话，他的任期还剩下挺久的（至19年12月）。有机会再委任一位美国人，或者让现任这位得到再次委任吗？
S: 我们没有在考虑这个问题。
R: 没有吗？
S: 没有。
R: 那就将来再考虑。回到刚才的问题。你提出了一系列问题，包括上诉机构以及其他改革议题，比如通报机制和进一步区分发展中国家，后者并不是上诉机构的问题。你觉得这些事情要一起推进，还是说上诉机构的问题是在另外的轨道上，我们可能先搞定它的问题，其它问题可以分开处理？还是说这些全都属于一个大包袱，它们需要同时搞定？
S: 我觉得这些都在各自的轨道上，没有一种单一的开展方式。一些成员想先解决上诉机构的问题，通报的问题在另一条轨道上。要想让改革成功，必须一步一步来，我们从通报问题开始，看看在区分发展中国家的问题上有什么能做的，我们也会继续在上诉机构上与任何有意愿的成员合作。我们会拭目以待。
R: 在布宜诺斯艾利斯，Lighthizer大使说WTO第11次部长级会议（MC11）将会被铭记，因为它打破了WTO的僵局，许多成员意识到WTO必须在关键领域重新开始行动，观点相似的WTO成员与它们的选民可以摆脱少数几个不愿行动的成员国限制。他说得对吗？僵局已经打破了吗？我知道你不想说他说错了，给我们更新一下现状吧。
S: Lighthizer大使在布宜诺斯艾利斯指出了WTO应该做的事情，他做得很好。这些对话已经开始了，也要继续下去。我们在MC11签署了一个有关电商的诸边协定（plurilateral），我们在这方面有积极的行动。我觉得Bob（Lighthizer）给这些对话起了个很好的头。
R: 我很高兴你提了电商的问题，这是我正想问的。你对这个问题有什么预测？你觉得在电商方面真的有可能达成诸边协定吗？
S: 我们在这方面有很多的参与。我们在这场诸边对话开始的时候发布了一份文件，目标定得很高：为电商寻求一种商业上有意义的结果。我们想要禁止数据的本地化，为保证数据在国际间自由流通而建立约束条例，约束国家向公司索要源代码的能力，永久禁止对电子商品和电子交易征税【和我国的电商法直接冲突】… 顺便一提，南非和印度正在考虑暂缓征收这些税。美国在这方面积极参与，我们的目标很高。在这件事上的共识是，谈判可能会在明年年初开始，在达沃斯可能会发表部长级声明。其它成员国的目标没有这么高，所以我们需要继续观察事态的发展。既然提到了电商诸边对话的问题，我也想借此机会声明一下，美国在积极参与WTO的事务，在WTO一个渔业多边协商中也有很积极的参与，这是我们在下一届部长级会议之前要做好的一个多边议题。我们也在农业方面积极参与。我们相信，要想在农业谈判中取得进展，必须要对现代农业的状况有着很好的了解。我们向农业委员会提交了很多的文件，向他们描述我们怎么看农业的现状。美国在默默地参与大部分的委员会工作，我们在《贸易促进协定》的实施方面做了大量工作，我们积极参与三年一度的《技术性贸易壁垒协定》审议，我们大概也是唯一一个在吸纳新成员这方面做工作的。我们在WTO中有着非常深度的参与，我希望大家在走之前能了解这一点。
R: 我跟高兴你提到了这一点。我跟日内瓦那些并非来自于这届政府的人聊过，他们也是这么认为的：美国在WTO一直是低调地高度参与。你提到了渔业，你对下届部长级会议之前在渔业补贴方面达成协定感到乐观吗？
S: 我们理应在2019年12月之前把渔业协定搞定，但是下一届部长级会议在2020年6月的哈萨克斯坦举行，所以我们有6个月的缓冲期。这不仅对全球的海洋意义重大，也关系到WTO这个组织的可行性。如果我们无法处理好这唯一一个部长们指定要在明年的会议前达成的多边协定，这对整个组织来说都会是一个坏消息。对WTO来说，在渔业方面达成某种协定有着重要的体制性后果。这个项目由墨西哥驻WTO大使Roberto Zapata领导，他做得很好，美国也在积极参与。
R: 也有其它几个本届政府上任之前就已经存在的诸边协定。可以评论一下现任政府对它们的观点是什么吗？你对这些诸边对话的预测是怎样的？我是指《环境商品协定》（EGA）和《服务贸易协定》（TiSA）。这些协定已经没戏了吗？
S: 我不觉得这两个协定已经死掉了，它们正在华盛顿接受审理。
R: 他们要审18个月吗？
S: 你可能没有留意，过去一两个月在贸易领域发生了很多事情（笑），大家都很忙。但这两个文件都在审理的过程中。
R: 你觉它们的进展仅仅取决于美国的审理结果吗？为什么没有成员国想强行推进？在这两个协定的问题上，日内瓦的其它成员国在等我们吗？
S: 我在WTO的同事们会定期问我关于服贸协定的问题，环境商品协定问得不多。他们在等美国的信号。
R: 我只是感到好奇：我记得最后一次讨论环境商品协定的时候，主要的问题集中在中国和欧盟之间，而不是中国和我们之间。中国和欧盟在主动解决这些问题吗？
S: 我没有见到这种努力。
R: 好吧。
S: 可能他们正在幕后商量，但是我没有看到。
R: 我们早晚会知道的。我很高兴得知这些协议虽然是在苟延残喘，至少还没有死透。我想鼓励这届政府完成这些审核，向我们通报下一步的计划。我们转向剩下几个大问题，把最大的问题留到最后。一个是国家安全的问题，这不仅仅是因为美国，也因为俄罗斯和乌克兰的问题。美国和俄罗斯都曾经以国家安全为由采取贸易制裁手段，理由是《关税与贸易总协定》（GATT）第21条给了它们这么做的特殊权力。你担心这些行为会导致对21条的滥用吗？这些做法纵使对美国的立场有利，是否有可能鼓励其它国家照搬，进而威胁整个体制？
S: 美国这么做已经有很多年了，这也是我们的政策：以国家安全为由采取的贸易方面的行动不需要经过审核，在WTO或《关税与贸易总协定》那里也享有豁免权。实际操作中，一个国家想援引第21条要受到很多的自我限制，它们会担心其它国家的反制措施。我们就经历了很多反制措施，比如很多国家针对美国的323制裁（323 Action）采取了反制关税。我觉得对WTO来说，最坏的结果不是对第21条的援引，而是WTO通过争端解决机制，认为他们有资格判断一件事是否符合美国的国家安全，或者其它任何成员的国家安全。
R: 好的。我们谈谈房间里的另一个大象：中国。Lighthizer大使在这件事上多次发表评论，我想请你复述一下Lighthizer的话，你也可以补充自己的观点。WTO真的具备对付中国和中国的产业政策的手段吗？如果没有，我们该怎么解决这个问题？
S: 以WTO目前的组成部分，它不具备这些手段。我的职责之一就是帮助成员国认识到中国的非市场经济对美国和其它WTO成员可能带来的影响。这就是为什么美国在7月的WTO总理事会议上提交了一份关于中国经济模式的文件。美国、日本和欧盟正在一项三边程序中合作，致力于在多个领域分享有关中国的信息：一是产业政策和国企，二是强迫性技术转移，三是市场经济的种种组成元素是什么，我们能否在市场经济的定义上达成一致。这就包括建立新的规则，美国、欧盟和日本正在技术层面探讨有关产业政策和国企的新规则，这一点的进展最快；也可能产生有关强迫性技术转移的规则。不只是建立新的规则，这项程序也包括分享信息，确保成员国遵守现有WTO规则约束，探讨这些规则是否还有潜在的改进空间。
R: 很高兴你提到了这项努力，我们可以多谈谈。假设美日欧盟在这些方面达成了某种协定，下一步怎么办？你们会尝试让其它国家加入吗？然后你们会去跟中国接触吗？
S: 是的，上一个三边声明里提到了，三个成员将会在年末前通过国内程序，并向WTO的其它国家沟通，这可能会发生在明年早些时候。一旦在这三个国家之间达成了某种协定，我们就会开始与其它成员国沟通。你提到了加拿大的那份文件，里面提到了要围绕产业补贴和国企建立新的规定。我觉得WTO成员对这些手段是有需求的。
R: 我读到一篇报道，说欧盟和中国的代表关于这些问题在昨天或前天见了一面。你对此有什么消息吗？
S: 哦，我去谷歌搜了一下，我想知道他们有没有发布联合声明或联合公报，但是我没看到。我得跟日内瓦的同事们聊一聊，看看能了解到什么信息。
R: 我们跟中国人在这些议题上见过面了吗？
S: 哪些议题？
R: 我是指，我们在WTO里向中国提出过这些问题吗？
S: 我在阐述美国对中国经济体系的担忧时，中国大使也在，他们应该很清楚我们的立场。
R: 关于"非市场经济地位"的案子，能给我们一些新的信息吗？这件事走到哪一步了？不论输赢，这个案子对美国会有什么影响？
S: 欧盟的案子进展更快一些，应该在年末或明年年初会有结果，美国和欧盟在这个问题上保持密切合作。这个决定对WTO的争端解决体系有重要意义。对于非市场经济而言，我们应该有权在倾销案中替代市场价格。即使在中国加入WTO之后，我们也没有放弃这种权利，这是我们谈判条件的一部分。Bob Lighthizer说这个案子如果没有判好，结果会是灾难性的。这是一个重要的决定。
R: 美国法律包括了迁徙自由的条款，我们对界定市场经济有很清楚的条件，中国很明显不符合这些条件。如果我们输掉这个案子，只有国会采取行动才能弥补问题，这是灾难性的。最后一个问题，也是房间里的另一头大象：特朗普总统想要退出WTO吗？你已经打包准备回家了吗？
S: 特朗普总统说WTO要好自为之，他说得对。我在WTO的职责就是要以友好、开放和透明的方式传达一些困难的信息。所有关注WTO的人都会同意，WTO是需要好好整顿一下了，谈判机制需要重现活力，贸易争端解决机制需要修理，监管机制也没在正道上。特朗普总统说得对。我把我的家人带到了日内瓦，希望能有所帮助，做建设性的工作。
R: 也就是说你还没打包，至少目前没有。
英文对话如下：
Reinsch:
One issue is who gets to make the rules?The appellate body its own initiative or the DSB? I think that's the point that most people here would agree that it should be the members
Shea:
that's what we agreed to in 1994
Reinsch:
okay but that doesn't address the question of supposing the DSB wants to legitimize some things the appellate body has been doing that we don't like
Shea:
then it would have to be done by consensus we would object, yeah
Reinsch:
all right I guess where this is heading is the administration…I think first it's a very fair point that this predates this administration. this goes back a long way and the Obama administration in particular took some actions, particularly with respect to reappointments of the body to reflect its unhappiness with some of the same
issues so it's important to note as you did that this is not a new thing
In fact there were some people as you know back in 1994 there were some people saying, this is what was going to happen
so I don't think you're going to find a lot of people here who will say that the administration's arguments are misplaced. like some other things in the administration I think the argument here has been, you know, the diagnosis maybe correct but the prescription may not be you know what the administration'stactic is to object to filling the vacancies that are occurring or both reappointments and new appointments
so we are now in a situation where by the end of next year there won't be a quorum anymore there will only be there will only betwo left and which would make it reallyimpossible for the appellate body to do its work where's the off-ramp here you know howdo we get to a resolution of this system or is the administration's goal reallyto let it die and then see what happens then?
Shea:
You know, again, our position is we want the appellate body to come back to what we negotiated to return to what our understanding was in 1995
so you know people ask me what does the U.S. want, what's the negotiating demand our proposal is that the appellate bodyreturn abide by the rules as we agreed to in 1995 and they've gone astray so I'm again I'm engaging my colleagues if they have a proposal to offer I will we will examine it and respond to itbut so far there really isn't any proposal put forward in Geneva you talked about the EU paper that's a Brussels paper that hasn't been put forward in Geneva I understand that they intend to take some of those ideas and put them forward in Geneva but again our position is, we already negotiated this, so the appellate body needs to return to what we negotiated and we again we will take two totango(?) we'll see that see if members respond I've been frankly surprised because this has been an issue I've heard a lot about in in Geneva at the WTO yet there been no proposals you know offered in any significant way on these issues so that tome has been surprising if it's that important where it were the ideas
Reinsch:
well I think the point of the article I alluded to in the beginning is that this is perhaps now being taken more seriously than it was before so we'll see but you made the point in the very beginning of your remarks that this is not an organization that moves with lightning speed no that's for sure so let's gain that out a bit
suppose you know you know this may take a while even if assuming we can move in the direction that you want so December 2019 arrives, we are still blocking reappointments, they're down to two we are a major user of the system we are a major bringer of cases and weare a major respondent in cases the ones we bring we usually win and we have a slightly better record on the losing side than although you know the plaintiff generally wins what are going to be the consequences for the cases that we care about if the appellate body ceases to function what happens if we lose, you know, a major case in 2020 and have no place to go
Shea:
well again we will see where this ends up we have put forward our proposals and weare waiting for members to respond there are other alternatives within the DSU
there's article 25: arbitration, as a possibility but again we want the appellate body to return to what we already negotiated
Reinsch:
would we support use of article25?
Shea:
potentially
Reinsch:
we have our own - we don't have an assigned seat - but we have there's an American on it right now whose term I think is not up for a good while as I recall
what are the chances of getting another American appointed or this one reappointed
Shea:
that's not something we think about
Reinsch:
it's not down the road let's go back you put a bunch of things on the table
there are appellate body issues and the other reforms you talked about – notification, the differentiation issues,which are not really appellate body issues
do you see all these things as needing or having to move forward together or is the appellate body and particular kind of on a separate track and maybe we can fix the appellate body and not all these other things or at least not at the same time and deal with it separately or are we talking about one big package that has to happen here?
Shea:
I think everything's on a separate track. I don't think there's a single undertaking.
Some members want to focus on the appellate body first. The notifications issue is on a separate track. I think if for reform to take place will have to be an incremental process.
we will start with notifications
see if we can do something on differentiation but will continue to engage on the appellate body issues with anyone who wants to engage and we'll see where it goes.
Reinsch:
yeah in at Buenos Aires, Ambassador Lighthizer said MC 11 will be remembered as the moment when the impasse at the WTO was broken. Many members recognize that the WTO must pursue a fresh startin key areas so that like-minded WTO members and their constituents are notheld back by the few members that are not ready to act. So have you read about that? Has the impasse been broken? I don't want you...you're not gonna say well...
Shea:
Yeah, Ambassador Lighthize Howard did atremendous job pointing out what needed to be done at the WTO in his remarks at Buenos Aires at the ministerial conference. So the conversation began its continuing notifications, differentiation. One thing we signed up at MC 11 was on a plurilateral on e-commerce and digital trade. We're very much engaged in that and so I think Bob got the conversation really fired up and started
Reinsch:
what's yours... I'm glad you mentioned e-commerce because I was going to bring it up. What's your prognosis on that? Is a reallya chance for a plurilateral agreement on that?
Shea:
Well, we've been very engagedin that. We put forward a paper at the outset of the discussions around that plurilateral that seeks very high ambition commercially meaningful outcome for e-commerce. We want to have prohibitions on data localization, disciplines around to ensure that this free flow of information, free flow of data across borders disciplines around countries requiring companies to give up their source code permanent ban on taxation or duties on digital
transmissions and by the way South Africaand India want to rethink the current moratorium on those on those duties, sowe have a very... the u.s. is very engaged and we have a very high ambition approach to that. The general view is that negotiating part of this process may begin early next year; perhaps a ministerial statement around Davos and other members have lower ambitions. So how this
works out still remains to be seen.
I just want to get if I may use this opportunity because I mentioned the digital plural addled. The u.s. is very engaged at the WTO and I want people to understand that. We're very engaged in the one multilateral negotiation on fish which is the one thing we're supposed to do on a multilateral basis by the next ministerial, so very much engaged in that. (We’re)very much engaged in agriculture. We believe that we need to move forward on agriculture negotiations; we have to have a proper understanding of the state of Agriculturetoday. So we're very much engaged in that. I have submitted many many papers to the Committee on agriculture to describe how we see the state of Agriculture today and frankly the United States is involved, you know, below the radar on much of the committee work at the WTO, we're very involved in the implementation of the trade facilitation agreement; we're very involved in the triennial review of the TBT agreement; we're probably the only country involved in accessions work of the WTO so we are very very much engaged in the WTO. So I just want people to understand that before they leave.
Reinsch:
I'm glad you said that. I would say based on my conversations with people there that are - not part of the administration - they say thesame thing -
Shea:
Good.
Reinsch:
- that American engagement continues at a high level below the radar. You mentioned fish and that is important. How optimistic are you that we're going to be able to get an agreement on on fish subsidies by the time of the next ministerial?
Shea:
well we're supposed to get the fish subsidies agreement done by December 2019 but the next ministerial is June 2020 in Kazakhstan, so maybe we got a six month, you know, grace period; but it's incredibly important not just for the world's oceans but for the viability of the institution. I mean if it cannot achieve the one multilateral outcome that the ministers directed the WTO to achieve by the next ministerial then that does not bode well for the institution. So this is very important institutional implications for the WTO to have an outcome in fish. Again the efforts being led by Roberto Zapata, the ambassador of Mexico, he's doing a really good job and again the United States is is really engaged in that effort.
Reinsch:
There are a couple other plural laterals that predate the administration and maybe you could comment both on the administration's position on them and your prognosis for their future. That's the environmental goods agreement and the trade in services agreement. Are they dead?
Shea:
I want to say they're dead. I think they're under-review in the building.
Reinsch:
They are going review for 18months?
Shea:
Well you maybe haven't noticed there's been a lot going on the trade area over the past 18 months. So our folks are very busy but there's still two initiatives are still under review.
Reinsch:
Do you think progress on either of them depends solely on the results of the US review? Why wouldn't other countries go forward and try to conclude them anyway and force the issue? Is everybody waiting for us in Geneva on those?
Shea:
I get asked periodically you know what's by my counterparts at the WTO, what's your view on Tisa, Alesso, on EGA, but I hear about that periodically and I think that they're looking for some looking for some signal from the United States.
Reinsch:
I guess I'm just curious because my recollection of where the EGA... I wouldn't say ended up but where it was last dealt with was there were a number of issues but they were mostly issues between China and the EU more than us but you don't see any effort to resolve those on their own?
Shea:
I don't see that. No.
Reinsch:
Okay.
Shea:
Maybe happening behind the scenes but I don'tsee it.
Reinsch:
I guess we'll find out but it's good to know that they're not dead maybe life support and you know I would just encourage the administration to complete its review and tell us all how they want to proceed.
Let's turn to saving two of the bigger issues for last. One of the issues that has been floating around not only because the United States but also because of Russia and the Ukraine case isnational security and the WTO both the United States and previously the Russian the Russians have taken trade restrictive action in the name of of nationalsecurity arguing article 21 of the GATT gives them an exception and the right to do so. Are you concerned that those actions kind of open Pandora's Box as faras the use of article 21 is concerned and we may be creating a precedent that while it might support the u.s. position, is going to also have the effect of encouraging essentially everybody else to do the same thing to the detriment of the system.
Shea:
Well it's always been the practice formany years of the United States or the policy of the United States that you know actions taken for national security or trade related. Actions taken for national security are not subject to review, not just disabled before the WTO or GATT and I think what has in inpractice countries have been restrained have exercised self-restraint in invoking article 21 a begad maybe because they're concerned about counter measures imposed by other parties as what happened you know with the u.s. we had some counter, some members in post counter tariffs in response to our 232 action but I think the worst outcome for the WTO would not be invocations of article 21 but if the WTO through the dispute settlement system decided that it was in the position to judge whether something was or was not in the national security interest of the United States or any other member.
Reinsch:
Okay, let's then talk about the other elephant in the room which is China and ambassador lightly[not sure 40:48] has commented on this a number of times and maybe I'll ask you to... I assume repeat his comments unless you want to say something different. You know, is the WTO really equipped to deal with China and to deal with China's and industrial policies and if not, how do we grapple with this problem?
Shea:
well the WTO as currently constituted is not equipped and one of my job's is to help educate the membership about the ramifications of China's non-economic, non-market economy, not just for the United States but for the WTO membership at large and that's why the u.s.submitted that paper on the Chinese economic model at the just last General Council meeting in July. The US, Japan, the EU are now engaged in something called the trilateral process. They're looking at ways to share information. They're looking at number of areas, one on industrial subsidies the state-owned enterprises,the another on the issue of forced technology transfer and the third issue on you know defining what are the elements of a market economy. Can we have a common understanding of what a market economy is and part of this effort involves development of new rules so the US and the EU and Japan are engaged in discussions out of technical staff level about the development of new rules regard industrial subsidies and SOE - that's the furthest along and potentially new rules around forced technology transfer.
It's not just new rules. it's also information sharing and making sure that existing WTO disciplines are properly enforced and maybe potentially improved.
Reinsch:
let's pursue that that effort for a moment.I'm glad you commented on it. What is the game plan assume that the US, the EU and Japan come to some sort of agreement on what they want to put forward in all those areas. What happens next? Are you going to try to get other countries to join the effort and you are going to approach the Chinese or...
Shea:
yes once the last trilateral statement says that they're going to try to...each of the trilateral members are trying to resolve their internal processes by the end of the year and then reach out to other countries, other WTO members, probably early next year. So yes it's eventually once there's a common agreement among the trilateral partners then we'll move out to to approach other members and fret you know, you mentioned the Canadian paper - we talked about the Canadian paper earlier in this discussion and there was a reference in that Canadian paper to developing newrules around industrial subsidies and SOE. so I think there's anappetite in the among the WTO membership for this approach.
Reinsch:
I saw. It was a report that the EU met with the Chinese either yesterday or the day before on these issues you haveany news about... how about that?
Shea: well yeah I googled that and I was wondering whether they issued a joint statement or a communique and I did notsee anything. so I'll have to talk to my colleagues back in Geneva and see whatcame out of that.
Reinsch:
Have we done that yet? Have that kind of meeting with the Chinese on these issues?
Shea:
When you say these issues what do you mean?
Reinsch:
I mean the WTO context have we raised.
Shea:
Well the Chinese ambassador has been in the room when I've laid out the problems we have economic system so they they're pretty much aware of pretty much aware of what our views are.
Reinsch:
Tell us a little bit about the this brain ís up to date if you will on the status of the non-market economy case in against the EU in the US.sort of where is that?what timetable do you see and what are the implications forthe u.s. ? win or lose?
Shea:
The EU case is on a faster track than the u.s. case so there probably will be a decision on the EU case where the EU and the US are cooperating by the way, probably a decision on the EU case maybe by the end of the year or early next year. This is a very important decision for the dispute settlement system of the WTO. We feel that you know for non-market economies...we should be able to substitute market determined prices for dumping cases and you know just because China acceded - we didn't give up that right when China acceded to the to the WTO as you know as part of our bargain so we'll see what happen. You know Bob light Heiser said it would be catastrophic if they came out the wrong way but this would be an important decision.
Reinsch:
It's one clearly where I think US law constrains our freedom of movement I think the US law is very clear about the circumstances under which we could consider the market economy and it's hard to argue that they meet those criteria so it would require an act of Congress I think to change anything if we were to lose which makes it catastrophic probably.
Okay my last question before we all goto all of you is the other elephant in the room, you know is the president pulling us out of the WTO? Are your bags packed? are you ready to come back home?
Shea:
Look the president was right to say thatthe WTO needs to shape up and that's my job at the WTO delivery some difficult messages hopefully in a friendly way and open and transparent way but he was right you know, and frankly everybody else there who falls pays attention to the WTO agrees, the WTO needs to be shape up it, I mean the negotiating function needs to be reinvigorated,the dispute settlement system needs to be fixed, the monitoring function is indisarray. So he was right to say that.
So I'm there - I brought my family therebut Geneva I'm there to try to help and be constructive.
Reinsch:
The bags are not packed, at least notyet.
致谢
翻译：Litian
校对：译心 彦帆
编辑：吃橘子吃成小黄人